15.02.2021 от 11:00
Аналитичен семинар в Zoom с лектор Мадлен Ангелова-Елчинова:
Intuitions as the Demise of Normativity
Abstract:
As successfully showed by Herman Cappelen, intuition-talk occupies a serious portion of philosophical research, both in first-order, as well as in second-order philosophy. The majority of arguments against intuition-talk can be regarded as an attack against the tool itself (e.g. against the instrument ‘philosophical intuition’). Most of them are either representing an attempt to undermine the credibility of intuitions – thus, their function to provide proper justification, or they are focusing on the mere nature of intuitions. In my talk, I hope to expose one very different way in which intuition methodology may come up short. I am going to argue that even if there is nothing wrong with the tool itself, relying on intuition-talk and intuition methodology is incompatible with normativity. Such claim has an advantage, because it is more modest than the attack against intuitions as the central tool of intuition methodology. In the same time, it is a weaker claim because in leaves open the possibility that philosophy is not a normative discipline. However, I am still going to insinuate that leaving normativity behind in favour of intuition-talk can have destructive consequences and that it can probably render philosophy a quite futile exercise of sharing one`s private intuitions.
In the beginning of my talk, I am going to introduce a very broad definition of ‘normativism’. Different versions of normativе claims can and do come with wide range of variation. Nevertheless, an argument in favour of a broader metaphilosophical claim concerning the incompatibility of intuition-talk and normativity requires the exposure of ‘the core’ of normativism. Therefore, the second task of my talk will be to analyze how philosophical intuitions are related to normativity. I will use a definition of philosophical intuitions that I have provided in a previous paper. Also, I will try to account for the methodological role that intuitions are supposed to play in philosophy, by reviewing the role they play in two particular domains – moral theory and theories of justification. What is going to be of interest here, is that intuitions are often used as a stepping stone for the construal of different normative claim. The relation between intuition-talk and such normative claims will be carefully examined. Thus, in the last portion of my talk I am going to show that there is indeed a tension between our understanding of intuitions and our understanding of normativity. My aim is to show that even if such a discrepancy may seem quite obvious and trivial, it is still what makes intuition methodology incompatible with normativism.
Key words: first-order philosophy, intuitions, normativity, justification
СЕМИНАРЪТ ЩЕ СЕ ПРОВЕДЕ В ZOOM:
https://us04web.zoom.us/j/2989443886?pwd=QVNkUy9ybXBFbkNSczJGemFwU1BTUT09
Meeting ID: 298 944 3886
Passcode: 277M0v
As successfully showed by Herman Cappelen, intuition-talk occupies a serious portion of philosophical research, both in first-order, as well as in second-order philosophy. The majority of arguments against intuition-talk can be regarded as an attack against the tool itself (e.g. against the instrument ‘philosophical intuition’). Most of them are either representing an attempt to undermine the credibility of intuitions – thus, their function to provide proper justification, or they are focusing on the mere nature of intuitions. In my talk, I hope to expose one very different way in which intuition methodology may come up short. I am going to argue that even if there is nothing wrong with the tool itself, relying on intuition-talk and intuition methodology is incompatible with normativity. Such claim has an advantage, because it is more modest than the attack against intuitions as the central tool of intuition methodology. In the same time, it is a weaker claim because in leaves open the possibility that philosophy is not a normative discipline. However, I am still going to insinuate that leaving normativity behind in favour of intuition-talk can have destructive consequences and that it can probably render philosophy a quite futile exercise of sharing one`s private intuitions.
In the beginning of my talk, I am going to introduce a very broad definition of ‘normativism’. Different versions of normativе claims can and do come with wide range of variation. Nevertheless, an argument in favour of a broader metaphilosophical claim concerning the incompatibility of intuition-talk and normativity requires the exposure of ‘the core’ of normativism. Therefore, the second task of my talk will be to analyze how philosophical intuitions are related to normativity. I will use a definition of philosophical intuitions that I have provided in a previous paper. Also, I will try to account for the methodological role that intuitions are supposed to play in philosophy, by reviewing the role they play in two particular domains – moral theory and theories of justification. What is going to be of interest here, is that intuitions are often used as a stepping stone for the construal of different normative claim. The relation between intuition-talk and such normative claims will be carefully examined. Thus, in the last portion of my talk I am going to show that there is indeed a tension between our understanding of intuitions and our understanding of normativity. My aim is to show that even if such a discrepancy may seem quite obvious and trivial, it is still what makes intuition methodology incompatible with normativism.
Key words: first-order philosophy, intuitions, normativity, justification
СЕМИНАРЪТ ЩЕ СЕ ПРОВЕДЕ В ZOOM:
https://us04web.zoom.us/j/2989443886?pwd=QVNkUy9ybXBFbkNSczJGemFwU1BTUT09
Meeting ID: 298 944 3886
Passcode: 277M0v
